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Abstract
This paper presents a model in which price setting firms decide what to pay attention 
to, subject to a constraint on information flow. When idiosyncratic conditions are 
more variable or more important than aggregate conditions, firms pay more attention 
to idiosyncratic conditions than to aggregate conditions. When we calibrate the model 
to match the large average absolute size of price changes observed in micro data, 
prices react fast and by large amounts to idiosyncratic shocks, but prices react only 
slowly and by small amounts to nominal shocks. Nominal shocks have strong and 
persistent real effects. We use the model to investigate how the optimal allocation of 
attention and the dynamics of prices depend on the firms’ environment. 
Keywords: rational inattention, sticky prices, real effects of nominal shocks. 
JEL Classification: E3, E5, D8. 5
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1009
February 2009
Non-Technical Summary
Phelps (1970) proposed the idea that real effects of monetary policy are due to 
imperfect information. Lucas (1972) formalized this idea by assuming that agents 
observe the state of monetary policy with a delay. The Lucas model has been 
criticized on the grounds that information concerning monetary policy is published 
with little delay. However, Sims (2003) points out that, if agents cannot attend 
perfectly to all available information, there is a difference between publicly available 
information and the information actually reflected in agents’ decisions. We think that 
a convincing model of real effects of monetary policy due to imperfect information 
must have two features. First, information concerning the current state of monetary 
policy must be publicly available. Second, it must be optimal for agents to pay little 
attention to this information. This paper develops a model with both features. The 
model helps explain micro and macro evidence on prices. 
In the model, price setting firms decide what to pay attention to, subject to a 
constraint on information flow. When idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or 
more important than aggregate conditions, firms pay more attention to idiosyncratic 
conditions than to aggregate conditions. When we calibrate the model to match the 
large average absolute size of price changes observed in micro data, prices react fast 
and by large amounts to idiosyncratic shocks, but prices react only slowly and by 
small amounts to nominal shocks. Nominal shocks have strong and persistent real 
effects. We use the model to investigate how the optimal allocation of attention and 
the dynamics of prices depend on the firms’ environment. 6
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“An optimizing trader will process those prices of most importance to his de-
cision problem most frequently and carefully, those of less importance less so,
and most prices not at all. Of the many sources of risk of importance to him,
the business cycle and aggregate behavior generally is, for most agents, of no
special importance, and there is no reason for traders to specialize their own
information systems for diagnosing general movements correctly.” (Lucas, 1977,
p. 21)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Phelps (1970) proposed the idea that real eects of monetary policy are due to imperfect
information. Lucas (1972) formalized this idea by assuming that agents observe the state
of monetary policy with a delay. The Lucas model has been criticized on the grounds
that information concerning monetary policy is published with little delay. However, Sims
(2003) points out that, if agents cannot attend perfectly to all available information, there
is a dierence between publicly available information and the information actually re ected
in agents’ decisions. We think that a convincing model of real eects of monetary policy
due to imperfect information must have two features. First, information concerning the
current state of monetary policy must be publicly available. Second, it must be optimal for
agents to pay little attention to this information. This paper develops a model with both
features. The model helps explain micro and macro evidence on prices. The model can be
used to study how the optimal allocation of attention and the dynamics of prices depend
on the economic environment.
In the model price setting rms decide what to pay attention to. Firms’ inability to
attend perfectly to all available information is modeled as a constraint on information  ow,
as in Sims (2003). Firms can change prices every period at no cost. The prot-maximizing
price depends on the aggregate price level, real aggregate demand and an idiosyncratic state
variable re ecting rm-specic demand or cost conditions. Firms face a trade-o between
paying attention to aggregate conditions and paying attention to idiosyncratic conditions.
We close the model by specifying exogenous stochastic processes for nominal aggregate7
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demand and the idiosyncratic state variables re ecting rm-specic conditions.
The model makes the following predictions. Firms adjust prices every period and yet
impulse responses of prices to shocks are sticky — dampened and delayed relative to the
impulse responses under perfect information. The extent of dampening and delay in a
particular impulse response depends on the amount of attention allocated to that type of
shock. When idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or more important than aggregate
conditions, rms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions than to aggregate condi-
tions. In this case, price responses to idiosyncratic shocks are strong and quick whereas
price responses to aggregate shocks are dampened and delayed. In addition, there are feed-
back eects, because rms track endogenous aggregate variables (the price level and real
aggregate demand). When rms pay limited attention to aggregate conditions, the price
level responds less to a nominal shock than under perfect information. If prices are strate-
gic complements, this implies that the prot-maximizing price responds less to a nominal
shock. Firms nd it optimal to pay even less attention to aggregate conditions. The price
level responds even less and so on.
We calibrate the stochastic process for nominal aggregate demand using U.S. macro data.
We calibrate the stochastic process for the idiosyncratic state variables so as to match the
average absolute size of price changes in U.S. micro data. Bils and Klenow (2004) and
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) study U.S. micro data that the Bureau of Labor Statistics
collects to compute the consumer price index. Bils and Klenow (2004) nd that half of all
non-housing consumer prices last less than 4.3 months. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) nd
that, conditional on the occurrence of a price change, the average absolute size of the price
change is over 13%. To match the large average absolute size of price changes in the data,
idiosyncratic volatility in the model has to be one order of magnitude larger than aggregate
volatility. This implies that rms allocate almost all attention to idiosyncratic conditions.
Therefore prices respond strongly and quickly to idiosyncratic shocks, but prices respond
only weakly and slowly to nominal shocks. Nominal shocks have strong and persistent real
eects. The model can explain the combination of observations that individual prices move
around a lot and, at the same time, the price level responds slowly to monetary policy8
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shocks.1 In fact, it is precisely the observation that individual prices move around a lot
that generates the slow response of the price level.
We use the model to study how the optimal allocation of attention and the dynamics of
prices depend on the rms’ environment. When the variance of nominal aggregate demand
increases, rms shift attention toward aggregate conditions and away from idiosyncratic
conditions. Since rms allocate more attention to aggregate conditions, a given nominal
shock has smaller real eects. However, the reallocation of attention is not large enough
to compensate fully for the fact that the size of nominal shocks has increased. On average
rms make larger absolute mistakes in tracking aggregate conditions and the variance of real
aggregate demand increases. In addition, since rms allocate less attention to idiosyncratic
conditions, rms also make larger mistakes in tracking idiosyncratic conditions. The predic-
tion that real volatility increases when nominal shocks become larger diers markedly from
the Lucas model.2 At the same time, our model is consistent with the empirical nding of
Lucas (1973) that the Phillips curve becomes steeper as the variance of nominal aggregate
demand increases.
The model has some shortcomings. First, the model cannot explain why prices remain
xed for some time. In the model prices change every period. One could add a menu cost.
It may be that reality is a combination of a menu cost model and the model presented
here. Adding a menu cost is likely to increase the real eects of nominal shocks even fur-
ther.3 Second, in some models of price setting the optimal decision is so simple that it
may be unclear why rms make mistakes at all. We think that in reality setting the prot-
maximizing price is complicated. In this paper we start from the premise that setting the
prot-maximizing price is complicated and we study the implications. We focus on the ten-
1Av a r i e t yo fd i erent schemes for identifying monetary policy shocks yield the result that the price level
responds slowly to monetary policy shocks. See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999),
Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) and Uhlig (2005). Uhlig (2005) nds that only about 25% of the long-run
response of the U.S. GDP de ator to a monetary policy shock occurs within the r s ty e a ra f t e rt h es h o c k .
2In the Lucas model an increase in the variance of nominal aggregate demand implies that prices become
more precise signals of nominal aggregate demand. Real volatility decreases.
3For menu cost models calibrated to micro data on prices see, for example, Gertler and Leahy (2006),
Golosov and Lucas (2006), Midrigan (2006) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2007a).9
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sion between attending to aggregate conditions and attending to idiosyncratic conditions.4
Third, it is di!cult to calibrate the parameter that bounds the information  ow. We do
not provide independent evidence on the right value for this parameter. We choose a value
for the parameter such that rms set prices that are close to the prot-maximizing prices.
W et h i n kt h i si sr e a l i s t i c .
This paper builds on Sims (1998, 2003). Sims argues that agents cannot attend per-
fectly to all available information and proposes to model this inability as a constraint on
information  ow. The rms’ problem in our model is, after a log-quadratic approximation
to the prot function, similar to the quadratic tracking problem with an information  ow
constraint studied in Section 4 of Sims (2003). One dierence is that rms in our model
face a trade-o between tracking aggregate conditions and tracking idiosyncratic conditions.
Another dierence is that rms in our model track endogenous variables. This introduces
the feedback eects.5
This paper is also related to the recent literature on real eects of monetary policy due
to imperfect information. Woodford (2002) studies a model in which rms observe nominal
aggregate demand with exogenous idiosyncratic noise. Woodford assumes that rms pay
little attention to aggregate conditions. In contrast, we identify the circumstances under
which rms nd it optimal to pay little attention to aggregate conditions and we study
how the optimal allocation of attention and the dynamics of prices depend on the rms’
environment.6 Mankiw and Reis (2002) develop a dierent model in which information
disseminates slowly. Mankiw and Reis assume that every period an exogenous fraction of
rms obtains perfect information concerning all current and past disturbances, while all
other rms continue to set prices based on old information. Reis (2006) shows that a model
4Zbaracki et al. (2004) provide some evidence consistent with the view that setting the prot-maximizing
price is complicated. Zbaracki et al. study price adjustment practices of a large manufacturing rm. They
nd that price adjustment costs comprise 1.2% of the rm’s revenues and 20.3% of the rm’s net margin.
Furthermore, they nd that managerial costs of price adjustment (“thinking costs”) are much larger than
physical costs of price adjustment (“menu costs”).
5Other papers that build on Sims (2003) include Luo (2006), Mondria (2006), Moscarini (2004) and Van
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006).
6Woodford’s (2002) model has been extended in a number of directions. Adam (2005) studies optimal
monetary policy. Hellwig (2002) studies the role of public information.10
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with a xed cost of obtaining perfect information can provide a microfoundation for this
kind of slow diusion of information. Note that in Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Reis (2006)
prices react with equal speed to all disturbances. In contrast, in our model prices react
quickly to some shocks and slowly to other shocks. Therefore the model can explain the
combination of observations that individual prices move around a lot and, at the same time,
the price level responds slowly to monetary policy shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the tools that we
use to quantify information  ow. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 derives the rms’
price setting behavior for a given allocation of attention. In Section 5 we solve a special case
of the model analytically. Afterwards we return to the model in its general form. In Section
6 we study the rms’ attention problem. In Section 7 we compute the rational expectations
equilibrium. Section 8 contains extensions and discusses shortcomings. Section 9 concludes.
2 Quantifying information  ow
In this section we present the tools from information theory that we use to quantify infor-
mation  ow.7
The basic idea of information theory is to quantify information as reduction in uncer-
tainty. In information theory uncertainty is measured by entropy.8 The entropy of a random








The entropy of a random vector [W =( [1>===>[ W) that has a multivariate normal distrib-











In the univariate normal case, entropy is a function of the variance. In the multivariate
normal case, entropy is a function of the number of random variables and their covariance
7See Cover and Thomas (1991) for a detailed exposition of information theory.
8Entropy as a measure of uncertainty can be derived from axioms. See Ash (1990). Moreover, entropy
turns out to be the answer to a number of questions in communication theory and statistics. See Cover and
Thomas (1991).11
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matrix. Entropy as a measure of uncertainty has appealing properties. For example, the
entropy of a random vector with a given number of random variables and given variances
is largest when the random variables are independent. Furthermore, when the random
variables are independent, the entropy of the random vector equals the sum of the entropies
of the individual random variables.9
In information theory conditional uncertainty is measured by conditional entropy. When
[W =( [1>===>[ W) and \ W =( \1>===>\ W) have a multivariate normal distribution, then the















[|\ is the conditional covariance matrix of [W given \ W.
Equipped with measures of uncertainty and conditional uncertainty one can quantify
the amount of information that one random vector contains about another random vector as
the dierence between unconditional uncertainty and conditional uncertainty. For example,











This measure of information is called mutual information. The name derives from the fact







One can also quantify the information  ow between two stochastic processes as the
average per period amount of information that one process contains about the other process.
Let [1>===>[ W and \1>===>\ W denote the rst W elements of the processes {[w} and {\w},
respectively. The information  ow between the processes {[w} and {\w} can be dened as




L ([1>===>[ W;\1>===>\ W)= (4)
The processes {[w} and {\w} can be vector processes. Two examples may help build intu-











9An alternative measure of uncertainty of a random vector is the determinant of the covariance matrix.
This measure of uncertainty satises the rst property but fails to satisfy the second property. For the
second property to hold one needs to take the log.12
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where [>\ is the correlation coe!cient. See Appendix A. This example illustrates that
information  ow is invariant to scaling of the variables and is bounded below by zero.









1  C[>\ ($)
¶
g$> (6)
where C[>\ ($) is the coherence between the processes {[w} and {\w} at frequency $.10 This
example illustrates that information  ow takes into account comovement at all frequencies.
We will use the denition of information  ow (4) to bound the amount of information
that a decisionmaker can absorb per period.
3 The model
3.1 Description of the economy
Consider an economy with a continuum of rms indexed by l 5 [0>1]. Time is discrete and
indexed by w.
Firm l sells good l.E v e r yp e r i o dw =1 >2>===,t h erm sets the price of the good, Slw,s o





3w(Sl>S >\ >] l)
#
> (7)
where Hlw is the expectation operator conditioned upon information of rm l in period w,
 5 (0>1) is a discount factor, and (Slw>S w>\ w>] lw) are real prots of the rm in period
w. The real prots depend on the price set by the rm, Slw, the price level, Sw,r e a la g -
gregate demand, \w, and an idiosyncratic state variable re ecting rm-specicd e m a n do r
cost conditions, ]lw. We assume that the function  is twice continuously dierentiable and
homogenous of degree zero in its rst two arguments, that is, real prots only depend on
the relative price Slw@Sw.W ea l s oa s s u m et h a t is a single-peaked function of Slw for given
Sw, \w and ]lw.11
10See Cover and Thomas (1991), pp. 273-274, or Sims (2003).
11For example, in a standard model of monopolistic competition with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences
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Prices are physically fully  exible, that is, rms can change prices every period at no
cost. Firms take as given the stochastic processes for the price level, {Sw}, real aggregate
demand, {\w}, and the idiosyncratic state variables, {]lw}. These assumptions imply that
the price setting problem is a purely static problem:
max
Slw
Hlw[(Slw>S w>\ w>] lw)]= (8)
We specify the aggregate environment of rms by postulating an exogenous stochastic
process for nominal aggregate demand.12 Let
Tw  Sw\w (9)
denote nominal aggregate demand and let tw  lnTwln ¯ T denote the log-deviation of nom-
inal aggregate demand from its deterministic trend. We assume that tw follows a stationary
Gaussian process with mean zero and absolutely summable autocovariances.





One obtains the same equation in a standard model of monopolistic competition after a
log-linearization.13
We specify the idiosyncratic environment of rms by postulating an exogenous stochastic
process for the idiosyncratic state variables. Let }lw  ln]lw ln ¯ ] denote the log-deviation
of the idiosyncratic state variable l from its deterministic trend. We assume that the }lw,
l 5 [0>1], follow a common stationary Gaussian process with mean zero and absolutely
summable autocovariances. Furthermore, we assume that the processes {}lw}, l 5 [0>1],a r e
where \w is the consumption aggregator, Sw is the corresponding price index and \w (Slw@Sw)
3 with A1
is the demand for good l. Costs of production F depend on the rm’s output and may also depend on
aggregate output through factor prices. In this example ]lw denotes rm-specicp r o d u c t i v i t y .I fF11 D 0
then  is a single-peaked function of Slw for given Sw, \w and ]lw.
12This approach is common in the literature. For example, Lucas (1972), Woodford (2002), Mankiw and
Reis (2002) and Reis (2006) also postulate an exogenous stochastic process for nominal aggregate demand.







1. Log-linearizing this equation around any point with the property that all the Slw
are equal yields equation (10).14
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pairwise independent and independent of {tw}.T h u s 14
1 Z
0
}lwgl =0 = (11)
Next we formalize the idea that agents cannot attend perfectly to all available informa-
tion. Following Sims (2003), we model attention as an information  ow and we model the
inability to attend perfectly to all available information as a constraint on information  ow.
Let vlw denote the signal that the decisionmaker in rm l receives in period w.T h i si st h e
new information that the decisionmaker uses in period w.L e t vw
l = {v1
l>v l2>===>v lw} denote
the sequence of all signals that the decisionmaker has received up to period w. The signal
vlw can be vector valued. We place a bound on the  ow of information:
I ({Sw>] lw};{vlw})  = (12)
The operator I measures the information  ow between aggregate and idiosyncratic con-
ditions (summarized by Sw and ]lw) and the signal vlw.T h e i n f o r m a t i o n  ow constraint
states that the average per period amount of information that the signal contains about
economic conditions cannot exceed the parameter . Thus the decisionmaker can only
absorb a limited amount of information every period.
We model the idea that decisionmakers can only observe and process a limited amount
of information every period due to limited cognitive ability. We formalize this idea as a
constraint on the information  ow between aggregate and idiosyncratic conditions (sum-
marized by Sw and ]lw) and the signal vlw. There are several alternative formulations of
the information  ow constraint that yield the same equilibrium. First, instead of including
the price level in the information  ow constraint we could have included any other macro
variable (or any set of macro variables) in the information  ow constraint. This yields the
same equilibrium. We prove this result below. The reason is that all aggregate variables are
driven by the same innovations — the innovations to nominal aggregate demand. Second,
instead of restricting the information content of the signal we could have also restricted
directly the information content of the price setting behavior. This also yields the same
equilibrium. We show this below. The only reason why we decided to think of price setting
14See Uhlig (1996), Theorem 2.15
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behavior as based on signals is that this facilitates comparison of our model to the large
literature on models with an exogenous information structure.15
We think that information  ow is a good reduced form description of the mental re-
sources required to take good decisions. When information  ow is large ( is high) the
price setting behavior is close to the prot-maximizing price setting behavior. When the
decisionmaker allocates a large fraction of the information  ow (his/her attention) to one
variable, mistakes in the response to that variable become small. The decisionmaker needs
to allocate more information  ow to a variable with high variance or low serial correlation
(for a given variance) in order to make small mistakes in the response to that variable.
We let rms choose the prot-maximizing allocation of attention. Formally, in period








lw>S w>\ w>] lw)
#
> (13)
subject to the information  ow constraint (12) and
SW
lw =a r gm a x
Slw
H[(Slw>S w>\ w>] lw)|vw
l]= (14)
The rm chooses the stochastic process for the signal so as to maximize the expected
discounted sum of prots. The rm has to respect the information  ow constraint (12).
The rm takes into account how the signal process aects its price setting behavior (14).
For example, the rm knows that if it pays no attention to idiosyncratic conditions it will
not respond to changes in idiosyncratic conditions.16
The rm can choose the stochastic process for the signal from the set .T h e s e t 
is the set of all signal processes that have the following four properties. First, the signal
that rm l receives in period w contains no information about future innovations to nominal
aggregate demand and future innovations to the idiosyncratic state variable, that is, the
signal contains no information about shocks that nature has not drawn yet. Second, the
15See for example the papers cited in Footnote 6, the literature on the social value of information (e.g.
Morris and Shin (2002)), the literature on global games (e.g. Morris and Shin (2003)) and the literature on
forecasting the forecasts of others (e.g. Townsend (1983)).
16Here we assume that the decisionmaker chooses the signal process once and for all. In Section 8.3 we
let the decisionmaker reconsider the choice of the signal process.16
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signal follows a stationary Gaussian process:
{vlw>s w>t w>} lw} is a stationary Gaussian process, (15)
where sw denotes the log-deviation of the price level from its deterministic trend. We relax
the Gaussianity assumption in Section 8.1. We show that Gaussian signals are optimal when
the objective function is quadratic and we also study the optimal form of uncertainty when
the objective function is not quadratic. Third, the signal that rm l receives in period
w is a vector that can be partitioned into one subvector that only contains information
about aggregate conditions and another subvector that only contains information about
idiosyncratic conditions:
vlw =( v1lw>v 2lw)> (16)
where
{v1lw>s w>t w} and {v2lw>} lw} are independent. (17)
This assumption formalizes the idea that paying attention to aggregate conditions and
paying attention to idiosyncratic conditions are separate activities. For example, attending
to the price level or the state of monetary policy is a separate activity from attending to
market-specic conditions. We relax this assumption in Section 8.2. Fourth, all noise in
signals is idiosyncratic. This assumption accords well with the idea that the constraint is
the decisionmakers’ limited attention rather than the availability of information.17
Finally, we make a simplifying assumption. We assume that each rm receives a long
sequence of signals in period one,
v1
l = {vl3">===>v l1}= (18)
This assumption implies that the price set by each rm follows a stationary process. This
simplies the analysis.18
17Conditions (15) and (17) can only be satised when {sw>t w} is a stationary Gaussian process and {sw>t w}
and {}lw} are independent. We will verify that this is true in equilibrium.
18One can show that receiving a long sequence of signals in period one does not change the information
 ow in (12).17
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3.2 Equilibrium
An equilibrium of the model are stochastic processes for the signals, {vlw}, the prices, {Slw},
the price level, {Sw}, and real aggregate demand, {\w}, such that:
1. Given {Sw}, {\w} and {]lw},e a c hrm l 5 [0>1] chooses the stochastic process for the
signal optimally in period w =0and sets the price for its good according to equation
(14) in periods w =1 >2>===.
2. In every period w =1 >2>===and in every state of nature, the price level satises (10)
and real aggregate demand satises (9).
4 Price setting behavior
In this section, we derive the rms’ price setting behavior for a given allocation of attention.
In the following sections, we study the optimal allocation of attention. We work with a log-
quadratic approximation to the prot function around the non-stochastic solution of the
model. This yields a log-linear equation for the prot-maximizing price and a log-quadratic
equation for the loss in prots due to a suboptimal price.
We start by deriving the non-stochastic solution of the model. Suppose that Tw = ¯ T for
all w and ]lw = ¯ ] for all l>w. In this case, the price that rm l sets in period w is given by
1
¡
Slw>S w>\ w> ¯ ]
¢
=0 >
where 1 denotes the derivative of the prot function  with respect to its rst argument.
Since all rms set the same price, in equilibrium
1
¡
Sw>S w>\ w> ¯ ]
¢
=0 =




1>1>\ w> ¯ ]
¢
=0 =
19It follows from Euler’s theorem that 1 is homogenous of degree minus one in its rst two arguments.18
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The last equation characterizes equilibrium real aggregate demand, denoted ¯ \ .20 The





Next we take a log-quadratic approximation to the prot function around the non-
stochastic solution of the model. Let {w  ln[wln ¯ [ denote the log-deviation of a variable
from its value at the non-stochastic solution. Let ˆ  denote the prot function expressed in
terms of log-deviations, that is, ˆ (slw>s w>| w>} lw)=
¡ ¯ Shslw> ¯ Shsw> ¯ \h |w> ¯ ]h}lw¢
.L e t˜  denote
the second-order Taylor approximation to the prot function ˆ  at the origin


















+ˆ 12slwsw +ˆ 13slw|w +ˆ 14slw}lw
+ˆ 23sw|w +ˆ 24sw}lw +ˆ 34|w}lw> (19)
where ˆ 1, for example, denotes the derivative of the prot function ˆ  with respect to its
rst argument evaluated at the origin. It is straightforward to show that ˆ 1 =0 , ˆ 11 ? 0
and ˆ 12 = ˆ 11.
After the log-quadratic approximation to the prot function, the price that rm l sets










lw denotes the prot-maximizing price of good l in period w
s+







The price that the rm sets equals the conditional expectation of the prot-maximizing
price. The prot-maximizing price is log-linear in the price level, real aggregate demand
and the idiosyncratic state variable. The ratio (ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|) determines the sensitivity of the
prot-maximizing price to real aggregate demand. A low value of (ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|) corresponds to
20Here we assume that this equation has a unique solution. For the prot function given in Footnote 11,
as u !cient condition is F11 + F12 A 0.
21Set the derivative of H





with respect to slw equal to zero and solve for slw.R e c a l l
that ˆ 1 =0 , ˆ 11 ? 0 and ˆ 12 = 3ˆ 11. This yields equation (20).19
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a high degree of real rigidity. See Ball and Romer (1990). The ratio (ˆ 14@|ˆ 11|) determines
the sensitivity of the prot-maximizing price to idiosyncratic conditions.
Next we introduce some notation by stating the price-setting equations (20)-(21) as
sW









where w  sw +(ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)|w denotes the prot-maximizing response to aggregate condi-











Whenever the price (20) diers from the prot-maximizing price (21) there is a loss in





lw>s w>| w>} lw
´
 ˜ (sW









The allocation of attention aects the price (20) and thereby the loss (24).
If rms face no information  ow constraint, all rms set the prot-maximizing price.
Computing the integral over all l of the prot-maximizing price (21) and using |w = tw sw












The xed point of this mapping is the equilibrium price level in the absence of an information
 ow constraint. Assuming ˆ 13 6=0 , the unique xed point is
s+
w = tw= (26)
Hence, if rms face no information  ow constraint, the price level moves one-for-one with
nominal aggregate demand.
5 Analytical solution when exogenous processes are white
noise
Next we study the optimal allocation of attention and we derive the rational expectations
equilibrium of the model. When tw and }lw follow white noise processes the model can20
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be solved analytically. In this section we illustrate the main mechanisms of the model
with the help of this simple example. Afterwards we solve the model under more realistic
assumptions concerning the exogenous processes.
In this section, we assume that tw follows a white noise process with variance 2
t A 0
and all the }lw, l 5 [0>1], follow a white noise process with variance 2
} A 0.W eg u e s st h a t
the equilibrium price level is a log-linear function of nominal aggregate demand
sw = tw= (27)
The guess will be veried. Furthermore, for ease of exposition, we immediately restrict the
rms’ choice of signals to signals of the form “true state plus white noise error”:
v1lw = w + %lw> (28)
v2lw = }lw + #lw> (29)
where w = sw +( ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)|w is the prot-maximizing response to aggregate conditions
and {%lw} and {#lw} are idiosyncratic Gaussian white noise processes that are mutually
independent and independent of {w} and {}lw}. Here we use a result that we prove in
Section 6: When w and }lw follow white noise processes, signals of the form “true state
plus white noise error” are optimal. See Proposition 4.22
Since the price level and the idiosyncratic state variable follow white noise processes and
































denote the information  ow concerning









denote the information  ow con-
cerning idiosyncratic conditions. A given allocation of attention (a pair 1 and 2 with
22Since {w = tw +( ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)(13 )tw one can make the signal (28) a signal concerning nominal
aggregate demand, real aggregate demand or the price level by multiplying the signal with a constant.
This yields a new signal that is associated with the same information  ow, the same conditional expectation
of {w and the same price setting behavior.21
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=2 22  1= (32)
When the information  ow constraint is binding, rms face a trade-o: attending more
carefully to aggregate conditions requires attending less carefully to idiosyncratic conditions.


























(}lw + #lw)= (33)
This price setting behavior is associated with the following expected discounted sum of










lw>s w>| w>} lw
´
 ˜ (sW





























The rst equality follows from (24). The second equality follows from (21) and (31)-(33).
When a rm chooses the allocation of attention (a pair 1 and 2 with 1 +2  )t h e
rm trades o losses in prots due to imperfect tracking of aggregate conditions and losses
in prots due to imperfect tracking of idiosyncratic conditions. The optimal allocation of
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A A A =
 if {  22
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2 + 1
4 log2 ({) if { 5
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232>22¤
0 if {  232
> (36)22
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. The attention allocated to aggregate conditions is increas-
ing in the ratio { — the variance of the prot-maximizing price due to aggregate shocks
divided by the variance of the prot-maximizing price due to idiosyncratic shocks. See
equation (23). The implications are straightforward. When idiosyncratic conditions are
more variable or more important than aggregate conditions, rms pay more attention to
idiosyncratic conditions than to aggregate conditions. In this case, the price (33) reacts
strongly to idiosyncratic shocks but only weakly to aggregate shocks. This can explain why
individual prices move around a lot and, at the same time, individual prices react little to
nominal shocks.









The equilibrium price level under rational inattention is the xed point of the mapping





A A A A ?











tw if  5
h
23>23 +( 2   23) ˆ 13
|ˆ 11|
i
0 if   23
> (38)
where   (ˆ 13t@|ˆ 14|}).23 The response of the equilibrium price level to a nominal
s h o c ki si n c r e a s i n gi nt h er a t i o. This ratio determines the optimal allocation of attention
and the strength of feedback eects. For example, when idiosyncratic conditions become
more variable, rms shift attention toward idiosyncratic conditions and away from aggregate
conditions. This implies that prices respond less to changes in aggregate conditions and
therefore the price level responds less to a nominal shock. In addition, there are feedback
eects, because the prot-maximizing price depends on endogenous variables. Recall that
the prot-maximizing response to aggregate conditions is given by w = sw+(ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)|w,
which can be expressed as w = sw+(ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)(tw  sw).W h e nrms pay limited attention
to aggregate conditions, the price level responds less to a nominal shock than under perfect
23The derivation of equation (38) is in the Technical Appendix.23
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information while real aggregate demand responds more to a nominal shock than under
perfect information. This changes the prot-maximizing response to a nominal shock. In
particular, if prices are strategic complements, that is (ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|) ? 1, the prot-maximizing
response to a nominal shock decreases. Firms nd it optimal to pay even less attention to
aggregate conditions. The price level responds even less and so on. The feedback eects
are stronger the smaller is (ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|), that is, the higher is the degree of real rigidity.
When  is very small, rms allocate no attention to aggregate conditions and the price
level equals its deterministic trend in every period. In contrast, when  is very large, rms
allocate all attention to aggregate conditions. Note that there is always a unique linear
rational expectations equilibrium.24
6T h e rms’ attention problem
Next we show how to solve the model when tw and }lw follow arbitrary stationary Gaussian
processes. In this section we study the optimal allocation of attention for a given process
for the price level. In the next section we compute the rational expectations equilibrium.
In this section, we guess that the equilibrium price level follows a stationary Gaussian





where the sequence {o}
"
o=0 is absolutely summable and w denotes the time w innovation to
nominal aggregate demand, which follows a Gaussian white noise process. The guess (39)
will be veried in the next section.
24There are similarities between this model and the setup studied in the literature on the social value of
information. The price set by a rm is a linear function of the conditional expectation of nominal aggregate
demand (an exogenous aggregate variable) and the conditional expectation of the price level (the average
action of other rms). We solve for a linear equilibrium by making a guess concerning the price level process
and by verifying this guess. This resembles the solution procedure in Section I.C in Morris and Shin (2002)
and in Angeletos and Pavan (2006). Note that the price set by a rm can be expressed as a weighted average
of rst-order beliefs about tw and sw or as a weighted average of higher-order beliefs about tw. Computing
higher-order beliefs can be useful to show that the linear equilibrium is the unique equilibrium (see Section
I.D in Morris and Shin (2002)) and to interpret equilibrium (see Section 3 in Woodford (2002)).24
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Firms choose the allocation of attention so as to maximize the expected discounted sum
of prots (13) subject to the information  ow constraint (12). The following two lemmata
allow us to simplify the objective function and the constraint.






























Proof. See Appendix C.
Prots at any price equal prots at the prot-maximizing price minus losses in prots
due to a suboptimal price. When the prot function is given by (19), the price setting
behavior is given by (20)-(21) and the loss in prots due to a suboptimal price is given
by (24). Using equation (24) and the stationarity of the prices (20)-(21) yields Lemma 1.






















The mean squared error in price setting behavior equals the mean squared error in the
response to aggregate conditions plus the mean squared error in the response to idiosyncratic
conditions.
Lemma 2 Suppose that (39) holds. Then














+ I ({}lw};{ˆ }lw})= (44)
If v1lw and v2lw are scalars, inequality (43) holds with equality.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Equation (42) states that the information  ow in (12) equals the information  ow con-
cerning aggregate conditions plus the information  ow concerning idiosyncratic conditions.
This follows from the independence assumption (17). Inequality (43) states that the signals25
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contain weakly more information than the conditional expectations computed from the sig-
nals. Equation (44) states that the information  ow between the sw process and the ˆ lw
p r o c e s se q u a l st h ei n f o r m a t i o n ow between the w process and the ˆ lw process. The reason
is that all aggregate variables and all linear combinations of aggregate variables are driven
by the same innovations — the innovations to nominal aggregate demand.
We solve the rms’ attention problem by a two-step procedure that follows from Lemma
1, equation (41) and Lemma 2. In the rst step we solve directly for the optimal price
setting behavior subject to an information  ow constraint on the price setting behavior. In
the second step we solve for optimal signals.
Proposition 1 Let the prot function be given by (19). Suppose that (39) holds. A signal
process obtained by the following two-step procedure solves the attention problem (12)-(14).



























+ I ({}lw};{ˆ }lw})  > (46)
n
w> ˆ lw>} lw> ˆ }lw
o




and {}lw> ˆ }lw} are independent. (48)






. Show that there exists a bivariate signal















Proof. See Appendix E.
Step one consists of solving directly for the optimal price setting behavior, subject to
a constraint on the information  ow between the prot-maximizing price setting behavior
(determined by w and }lw) and the actual price setting behavior (determined by ˆ lw and ˆ }lw).
See equations (22)-(23). The objective function (45) follows from Lemma 1 and equation26
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(41). The information  ow constraint (46) is weaker than the information  ow constraint
(12). See Lemma 2. Step two consists of showing that there exist univariate signals that
yield the solution to step one as conditional expectations. The requirement that the signals
v1lw and v2lw are scalars ensures that the inequality (43) holds with equality. Then (46)
implies (12).
For a given allocation of attention (a pair 1 and 2 with 1 + 2  ), the problem in





















I ({[w};{\w})  m> (54)






o=0 are absolutely summable and xw and w
follow independent Gaussian white noise processes with unit variance. The decisionmaker
chooses a process for \w to track [w. Equations (52)-(53) state that ([w>\ w) has to follow
a stationary Gaussian process. Equation (54) restricts the information  ow between [w
and \w.H e r e [w and \w stand for w and ˆ lw or }lw and ˆ }lw.I n t h e rst case, m equals
the information  ow allocated to aggregate conditions. In the second case, m equals the
information  ow allocated to idiosyncratic conditions. There are two dierences between
the problem studied in Section 4 of Sims (2003) and the rms’ attention problem. First, the
decisionmaker who has to set a price faces a multidimensional tracking problem. He or she
has to decide how to allocate the available information  ow across the problem of tracking
aggregate conditions and the problem of tracking idiosyncratic conditions. Furthermore, the
decisionmaker tracks an endogenous variable — the prot-maximizing response to aggregate
conditions, w = sw +(ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)|w. This introduces the feedback eects.
In the next section we implement the two-step solution procedure given in Proposition
1 numerically. In the rest of this section we present analytical results.27
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Proposition 2 A solution to the problem (51)-(54) satises:
H [[w  \w]=0 > (55)
and, for all n =0 >1>2>===,
H [([w  \w)\w3n]=0 = (56)
Proof. See Appendix F.
The quadratic Gaussian tracking problem with an information  ow constraint yields a
solution that looks like behavior based on noisy observations: errors are zero on average and
errors are orthogonal to current and past behavior. Thus step one of Proposition 1 yields
price setting behavior that looks like price setting behavior based on noisy observations.
When w and }lw follow rst-order autoregressive processes the rms’ attention problem
can be solved analytically. The next proposition characterizes the price setting behavior for
a given allocation of attention. The following equation characterizes the optimal allocation
of attention.
Proposition 3 If
[w = [w31 + dxw (57)
























The value of the objective function at the solution equals
H
h







22m  2= (59)
Proof. See Appendix G.
The response to an innovation in [w (that is w or }lw) is either hump-shaped or monoton-
ically decreasing. This follows from the fact that the impulse response function is a dierence
between two exponentially decaying series.26 See equation (58). Second, the mean squared
25If  =0we use the convention 0
0 =1 .
26Specically, the optimal response is hump-shaped if m is less than 3(1@2ln2)ln((13 )@);i nt h e
opposite case, the optimal response is monotonically decreasing.28
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error is decreasing in the information  ow allocated to that tracking problem, increasing in
the variance of the variable being tracked and decreasing in the persistence of the variable
being tracked (holding constant the variance of the variable being tracked). See equation
(59). Third, the marginal value of information  ow is decreasing in the information  ow
allocated to that tracking problem, increasing in the variance of the variable being tracked
and may be increasing or decreasing in the persistence of the variable being tracked (holding
constant the variance of the variable being tracked). This follows from dierentiating (59)
with respect to m.
In the case of an interior solution, the optimal allocation of attention has the property
that the marginal value of information  ow concerning aggregate conditions equals the
marginal value of information  ow concerning idiosyncratic conditions. Equating the two































Equations (58) and (60) characterize the solution to step one of Proposition 1 in the AR(1)
case. We still need to show that there exist univariate signals that yield the solution to step
one as conditional expectations. It turns out that in the AR(1) case signals of the form
“true state plus white noise error” have this property.
Proposition 4 Let \ W
w denote the process given by equation (58). The signal
Vw = [w +
s
22m








Proof. See Appendix H.
Finally, there are many alternative formulations of the rms’ attention problem that
yield the same equilibrium. First, equation (44) holds for any aggregate variable (not only
for sw). We prove this at the end of Appendix D. The reason is that all aggregate variables
are driven by the same innovations — the innovations to nominal aggregate demand. Hence,29
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instead of including the price level in the information  ow constraint we could have included
any other macro variable in the information  ow constraint.27 Second, we solve the rms’
attention problem by a two-step procedure. In the rst step we solve directly for the
optimal price setting behavior subject to an information  ow constraint on the price setting
behavior. Thus we could have also restricted from the start the information content of the
price setting behavior.
7 Numerical solutions when exogenous processes are serially
correlated
In this section we compute the rational expectations equilibrium for a variety of parame-
ter values. We solve the model numerically, because in equilibrium the prot-maximizing
response to aggregate conditions, w = sw +( ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)|w, in general does not follow an
AR(1) process.28 We compute the solution as follows. First, we make a guess concerning
the process for the price level. Second, we solve the rms’ attention problem by the two-step
procedure given in Proposition 1. We solve directly for the optimal price setting behavior
subject to an information  ow constraint on the price setting behavior. This is a standard
constrained minimization problem. The rst-order conditions are given in Appendix I. We
27Including a set of macro variables in the information  ow constraint (12) also yields the same equilibrium.
For example, in an earlier version of the paper we included both Sw and \w instead of just Sw in the information
 ow constraint. We prefer the new formulation of the information  ow constraint, because it simplies some
of the proofs without changing the equilibrium of the model. To see that both formulations of the information
 ow constraint yield the same equilibrium, note the following. In the earlier version of the paper we proved






+I ({}lw};{ˆ }lw}), with equality if (i) v1lw and v2lw are scalars
and (ii) v1lw = {w + %lw where {%lw} is an error process. We solved the model by a two-step procedure that
resembles the procedure given in Proposition 1. There was only one die r e n c e .I ns t e pt w ow eh a dt os h o w
that there exists a signal of the form v1lw = {w + %lw that has the property (49). We continue to verify that
s u c has i g n a le x i s t st oe n s u r et h a tt h et w of o r m u l a t i o n so ft h ei n f o r m a t i o n ow constraint yield the same
equilibrium. For example, in the AR(1) case this signal is given by Proposition 4.
28There is one notable exception. If (ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)=1the prot-maximizing response to aggregate conditions
equals tw.I nt h i sc a s e ,i ftw and }lw follow AR(1) processes, the equilibrium of the model can be computed
directly from equations (22), (58), (60) and (61). Note that with (ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)=1there are no feedback
eects.30
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then show that there exist univariate signals with the property (49)-(50). Third, we com-
pute the price level from equations (10) and (22). We compare the process for the price
level that we obtain to our guess and we update the guess until a xed point is reached.
7.1 The benchmark economy
In order to solve the model numerically, we must specify the exogenous process for nominal
aggregate demand, the exogenous process for the idiosyncratic state variables and the pa-
rameters (ˆ 14@|ˆ 11|), (ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|) and . See Table 1 for the specication of the benchmark
economy.
We calibrate the stochastic process for nominal aggregate demand using quarterly U.S.
nominal GNP data from 1959:1 to 2004:1.29 We take the natural log of the data and
we detrend the data by tting a second-order polynomial in time. We then estimate the
equation tw = tw31 + w,w h e r etw is the deviation of the log of nominal GNP from its
tted trend. The estimate of  that we obtain is, after rounding o, 0.95 and the standard
deviation of the error term is 0.01. The moving average representation of the estimated
process is tw =
P"
o=0 ow3o. Since with geometric decay shocks die out after a very large
number of periods and computing time is fast increasing with the number of lags, we
approximate the estimated process by a process that dies out after twenty periods: tw =
P20
o=0 dow3o, d0 =1and do = do31  0=05,f o ro =1 >===>20.30
We calibrate the stochastic process for the idiosyncratic state variables so as to match
the average absolute size of price changes in U.S. micro data. Bils and Klenow (2004)
nd that the median price changes every 4.3 months. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) nd
that, conditional on the occurrence of a price change, the average absolute size of the price
change is 13.3%. These statistics are computed including price changes related to sales.
When Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2007b) exclude sales,
both papers nd that the average absolute size of price changes is 8.5%. We choose the
standard deviation of }lw such that the average absolute size of price changes in our model
equals 8.5% under perfect information. This yields a standard deviation of }lw that is ten
29The source is the National Income and Product Accounts of the United States.




ow3o. While computing time was many times larger, the results were aected little.31
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times the standard deviation of tw. It is unclear whether one should exclude sales or not. We
prefer to match the smaller of the two statistics reported in the literature only because this
amounts to taking a conservative approach.31 For now, we abstract from the fact that in
the data prices remain xed for longer than a quarter, whereas in our model prices change
every quarter. Later we take into account that this change in frequency may aect the
estimated size of idiosyncratic shocks for a given observed size of price changes. Finally, in
the benchmark economy we assume the same rate of decay in the }lw p r o c e s sa si nt h etw
process.
The ratio (ˆ 14@|ˆ 11|) determining the sensitivity of the prot-maximizing price to the
idiosyncratic state variable has the same eects on equilibrium as the variance of the idio-
syncratic state variable. Therefore we normalize (ˆ 14@|ˆ 11|) to one and we only choose the
variance of the idiosyncratic state variable.
The ratio (ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|) determining the sensitivity of the prot-maximizing price to real
aggregate demand is a standard parameter in models with monopolistic competition. Wood-
ford (2003), chapter 3, recommends a value between 0.1 and 0.15. In the benchmark econ-
omy we set (ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)=0 =15 and later we show how changes in (ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|) aect the
solution.
We choose the parameter that bounds the information  ow such that rms set prices
that are close to the prot-maximizing prices. Based on this reasoning we set  =3bits.32
The following calculations illustrate  =3bits. Allocating 1, 2 and 3 bits of information
 ow to the problem of tracking a Gaussian white noise process yields a ratio of posterior
variance to prior variance of 1/4, 1/16 and 1/64, respectively. Tracking autocorrelated
processes is easier. Allocating 1, 2 and 3 bits of information  ow to the problem of tracking
a Gaussian AR(1) process with  =0 =95 yields a ratio of posterior variance to prior variance
of 1/32, 1/155 and 1/647, respectively. These numbers follow from equation (59). Thus
with  =3bits the available information  ow is large enough to track both aggregate and
idiosyncratic conditions well. This implies that decisionmakers set prices that are close
31Matching an average absolute size of price changes of 13.3% instead of 8.5% would require a larger
standard deviation of }lw. Matching a given average absolute size of price changes under rational inattention
instead of under perfect information also would require a larger standard deviation of }lw.
32Information  ow is measured in bits. This is explained in Sims (2003).32
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to the prot-maximizing prices. Therefore losses in prots due to suboptimal price setting
behavior are small and the marginal value of information  ow is low. Hence, decisionmakers
have little incentive to increase the information  ow.
To set the parameter that bounds the information  ow one cannot query oneself about
the information processing capacity of humans in the real world and endow decisionmakers
in the model with the same capacity. This is because economic models are drastic sim-
plications of the real world. For example, in our model decisionmakers take no decision
apart from the price-setting decision and they only need to track one rm-specicv a r i a b l e .
One has to choose the parameter that bounds the information  ow taking into account the
simplicity of the model. We choose the parameter such that rms in the model do very
well.
Table 1 and Figures 1-2 summarize the results for the benchmark economy. The average
absolute size of price changes under rational inattention is 8.2%. Firms allocate 94% of
their attention to idiosyncratic conditions. The optimal allocation of attention implies the
following price setting behavior. Figure 1 shows the impulse response of an individual price
to an innovation in the idiosyncratic state variable. Comparing the response under rational
inattention (the line with squares) to the response under perfect information (the line with
points), we see that the response to an idiosyncratic shock under rational inattention is
almost as strong and quick as under perfect information. The line with crosses is the impulse
response of an individual price to noise in the signal concerning idiosyncratic conditions.
Figure 2 shows the impulse response of an individual price to an innovation in nominal
aggregate demand. The response to a nominal shock under rational inattention (the line
with squares) is dampened and delayed relative to the response under perfect information
(the line with points). The line with crosses in Figure 2 is the impulse response of an
individual price to noise in the signal concerning aggregate conditions. Since the eect of
idiosyncratic noise washes out in the aggregate, the line with squares is also the impulse
response of the price level to an innovation in nominal aggregate demand. The price level
under rational inattention responds weakly and slowly to a nominal shock. The reasons
are as follows. First, to match the large average absolute size of price changes in the data,
idiosyncratic volatility has to be one order of magnitude larger than aggregate volatility.33
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This implies that rms allocate almost all attention to idiosyncratic conditions. Therefore
individual prices and the price level respond little to nominal shocks. Second, the prot-
maximizing response to a nominal shock depends on the price setting behavior of other
rms. Recall that w = sw +(ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)|w is the prot-maximizing response to aggregate
conditions. When all rms set the prot-maximizing price, the price level moves one-
for-one with nominal aggregate demand and w equals tw. In contrast, when rms face
an information  ow constraint, the price level moves less than one-for-one with nominal
aggregate demand and this changes the prot-maximizing response to a nominal shock.
The line with triangles in Figure 2 shows the impulse response of w to an innovation in
nominal aggregate demand at the rational inattention xed point. The feedback eects
imply that the rational inattention equilibrium is far away from the perfect information
equilibrium despite the fact that rms track the prot-maximizing response to aggregate
conditions well.
The impulse response of real aggregate demand to an innovation in nominal aggregate
demand equals the dierence between the perfect information impulse response in Figure
2 and the rational inattention impulse response in Figure 2. It is apparent that nominal
shocks have strong and persistent real eects.
Figures 3-4 show simulated price series. Figure 3 shows a sequence of prices set by an
individual rm under rational inattention (crosses) and the sequence of prot-maximizing
prices (diamonds). Since we have chosen a high value for , rms track the prot-maximizing
price very well. For an individual rm, the ratio of posterior variance to prior variance of
the prot-maximizing price is 1/300.33 Therefore losses in prots due to suboptimal price
















34For the prot function and the parameter values given in Section 8.1 we have |ˆ 11| =2 7¯ \ , which yields
an expected per period loss in prots due to imperfect tracking of aggregate conditions equal to 0=0005¯ \
and an expected per period loss in prots due to imperfect tracking of idiosyncratic conditions equal to
0=0028¯ \ . See equation (24) and Table 1. The marginal value of information  ow equals 0=004¯ \ .H e r ew e
assume a price elasticity of demand of 7. Thus a 10 percent price change induces a 70 percent change in
demand. Assuming a smaller price elasticity of demand yields even smaller losses in prot sa n da ne v e n
smaller marginal value of information  ow.34
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shows sequences of aggregate price levels. The equilibrium price level under rational inat-
tention (crosses) diers markedly from the equilibrium price level under perfect information
(diamonds). The reason is the optimal allocation of attention in combination with the feed-
back eects. To illustrate that rms make fairly small mistakes in tracking the equilibrium
price level, Figure 4 also shows the conditional expectation of the price level at the rational
inattention xed point (points).
The early New Keynesian literature emphasized that changes in real activity can be an
order of magnitude larger than losses of individual rms. See, for example, Akerlof and
Yelen (1985). We obtain a similar result in our model. The rational inattention equilibrium
is far away from the perfect information equilibrium, despite the fact that losses in prots
due to suboptimal price setting behavior are small. Firms do not take into account how
their attention aects aggregate variables.
In the benchmark economy, prices react strongly and quickly to idiosyncratic shocks,
but prices react only weakly and slowly to nominal shocks. Therefore the model can explain
the combination of observations that individual prices move around a lot and, at the same
time, the price level responds slowly to monetary policy shocks. The model is also consistent
with the nding by Boivin, Giannoni and Mihov (2006) that sectoral prices respond quickly
to sector-specic shocks and slowly to monetary policy shocks.
We turn to examining how changes in parameter values aect the optimal allocation of
attention and the dynamics of the economy.
7.2 Varying parameter values
Table 2 and Figure 5 show how changes in idiosyncratic volatility aect the solution. When
the variance of the idiosyncratic state variables increases, rms shift attention toward idio-
syncratic conditions and away from aggregate conditions. Therefore the response of the
price level to a nominal shock becomes more dampened and delayed. The model makes a
prediction about how prices in dierent sectors respond to nominal shocks: If the degree
of real rigidity is the same across sectors, rms operating in more volatile sectors respond
more slowly to nominal shocks.
T a b l e2a n dF i g u r e6i l l u s t r a t et h ee ects of a large increase in the variance of nominal35
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aggregate demand to a level one may expect in an economy with high and variable in ation.
When the variance of nominal aggregate demand increases, rms shift attention toward
aggregate conditions and away from idiosyncratic conditions. Since rms allocate more
attention to aggregate conditions, a given nominal shock has smaller real eects. However,
the reallocation of attention is not large enough to compensate fully for the fact that the size
of nominal shocks has increased. On average rms make larger absolute mistakes in tracking
aggregate conditions and the variance of real aggregate demand increases. In addition, since
rms allocate less attention to idiosyncratic conditions, rms also make larger mistakes in
tracking idiosyncratic conditions. The prediction that real volatility increases when nominal
shocks become larger diers markedly from the Lucas model. At the same time, our model
is consistent with the empirical nding of Lucas (1973) that the Phillips curve becomes
steeper as the variance of nominal aggregate demand increases.
The predictions described above would continue to hold in a model with an endogenous
. Suppose that rms can choose the information  ow facing an increasing, strictly convex
cost function, F (). Consider again the eects of increasing the variance of nominal ag-
gregate demand. Since the marginal value of information  ow about aggregate conditions
increases, rms choose a higher  and the marginal cost of information  ow increases. This
implies that the marginal value of information  ow about both aggregate and idiosyncratic
conditions has to increase. Firms track both aggregate and idiosyncratic conditions less
well.
Reducing the persistence of nominal aggregate demand (holding constant the variance
of nominal aggregate demand) has an unambiguous eect on the quality of tracking and
an ambiguous eect on the allocation of attention. Firms track the prot-maximizing price
less well and therefore losses in prots due to suboptimal price setting behavior increase.
This suggests that there is a payo from “interest rate smoothing” by central banks. The
attention allocated to aggregate conditions may increase or decrease, because reducing the
persistence of nominal aggregate demand makes rms track aggregate conditions less well
(for a given allocation of attention), but also lowers the improvement in tracking that can
be achieved by reallocating attention to aggregate conditions.35 These numerical ndings
35When we changed the persistence of the idiosyncratic state variables (holding constant the variance of the36
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are consistent with the analytical results in the AR(1) case. See Proposition 3.
Table 2 and Figure 7 illustrate how the ratio (ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|) aects the solution. When
the prot-maximizing price becomes less sensitive to real aggregate demand, the response
of the price level to a nominal shock becomes more dampened and delayed. The reason is
that the feedback eects become stronger.
Figure 8 illustrates how changes in  aect the solution. With  =3nominal shocks have
real eects for about 19 quarters. With  =4and  =5nominal shocks have real eects
for about 7 quarters and 5 quarters, respectively. With  =2rms allocate all attention to
idiosyncratic conditions. Real aggregate demand moves one-for-one with nominal aggregate
demand.36 Hence, the model’s prediction that nominal shocks have real eects is robust to
changes in the value of .T h ev a l u e s =2 >3>4>5 imply a ratio of posterior variance to prior
variance of the prot-maximizing price of 1/100, 1/300, 1/750 and 1/1250, respectively, and
expected per period losses in prots (as a fraction of steady state real output) of 1%, one
third of 1%, one seventh of 1% and one twelfth of 1%, respectively. We nd numbers in
this range reasonable.
We have chosen the variance of the idiosyncratic state variables so as to match the
average absolute size of price changes in U.S. micro data. So far we have abstracted from
the fact that in the data prices remain xed for longer than a quarter, whereas in our
model prices change every quarter. Let us now see how this change in frequency may aect
the estimated variance of idiosyncratic shocks for a given observed size of price changes.
Consider the following simple model: Firms can adjust prices every W p e r i o d sa si nT a y l o r
(1980), rms have perfect information, and the prot-maximizing price follows a random
walk without drift, where the innovation has a normal distribution with mean zero and
variance 2.I nt h i ss i m p l em o d e l ,arm that can adjust its price in a given period sets this
period’s prot-maximizing price, because this period’s prot-maximizing price also equals
idiosyncratic state variables), we also obtained ambiguous predictions concerning the allocation of attention.
However, for the benchmark economy, we found that decreasing the persistence of the idiosyncratic state
variables (holding constant the variance of the idiosyncratic state variables) always increased the attention
allocated to idiosyncratic conditions.
36This result is due to the fact that in our model all rms are identical. If a non-negligible fraction of rms
operate in stable idiosyncratic environments, the price level responds to nominal shocks also when  =2 .37
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the conditional expectation of the prot-maximizing price in future periods. The expected
absolute price adjustment after W periods equals
H [|slw+W  slw|]=
1
2
H [slw+W  slw|slw+W  slw A 0] +
1
2







because slw+W  slw has a normal distribution with mean zero and variance W2.T h e
second line follows from the formula for the expectation of a truncated normal distribution.
The expected absolute price adjustment is increasing linearly in
s
W. Thus increasing the
price duration from 3 months to W months raises the expected absolute price adjustment
by a factor of
p
W@3. When the prot-maximizing price follows a stationary process, the
formula for the expected absolute price adjustment is more complicated, but one can show
that increasing the price duration from 3 months to W months raises the expected absolute
price adjustment by less than a factor of
p
W@3. For example, when the prot-maximizing
price follows a white noise process, the expected absolute price adjustment is independent
of W. Motivated by these observations we computed the equilibrium of our model matching
an average absolute price adjustment of 6.3%, because
p
5=5@3=( 8 =5%)@(6=3%) where 5.5
months is the median price duration excluding sales reported in Bils and Klenow (2004) and
8.5% is the average absolute size of price changes excluding sales reported in Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2005) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2007b). We also computed the equilibrium
of our model matching an average absolute price adjustment of 4.7%, because
p
10@3=
(8=5%)@(4=7%) where 10 months is in the range of the median price durations excluding
sales reported in Nakamura and Steinsson (2007b). See Figure 9. Real eects of nominal
shocks decrease but remain sizable. Note that we take a conservative approach. We use
the median price durations excluding sales (5.5 months and 10 months) and the average
absolute size of price changes excluding sales (8=5%).37 Furthermore, we do not take into
account that in our model the prot-maximizing price follows a stationary process.
37If we decided to match the U.S. data including sales the average absolute size of price changes in our
model would have to equal 11.1%, because
s
4=3@3=( 1 3 =3%)@(11=1%) where 4.3 months is the median price
duration including sales reported in Bils and Klenow (2004) and 13.3% is the average absolute size of price
changes including sales reported in Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005).38
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7.3 Optimal signals
We always verify that there exist univariate signals that have the property (49)-(50). These
are optimal signals. Figures 10 and 11 show optimal signals for the benchmark economy.
Here we have computed optimal signals of the form “}lw plus a moving average error process”
and “w plus a moving average error process.” The signal concerning idiosyncratic condi-
tions turns out to have white noise errors. The signal concerning aggregate conditions has
autocorrelated errors. Taking a closer look at the signal concerning aggregate conditions
helps understand why autocorrelated errors can be optimal. In the case of this signal, elim-
inating autocorrelation in the errors (for a given variance of the error process) improves
tracking of aggregate conditions but also requires a higher information  ow. The value of
the improvement in tracking turns out to be smaller than the opportunity cost of the higher
information  ow.
While the optimal price setting behavior is unique, optimal signals are not unique. One
pair of optimal signals are the conditional expectations themselves, v1lw = ˆ W
lw and v2lw =ˆ }W
lw.
This follows from Proposition 2. Once we have an optimal signal it is easy to construct a new
optimal signal. For example, applying a one-sided linear lter yields a new signal that is an
element of the set  and is associated with the same information  ow. Typically, applying
a one-sided linear lter also does not change the conditional expectation computed from
the signal.38 Thus an optimal signal about aggregate conditions can be a signal concerning
the price level, real aggregate demand, nominal aggregate demand, w or the rms’ favorite
linear combination of these variables. It does not matter for the equilibrium whether rms
pay attention to the price level or real aggregate demand. What matters for the equilibrium
is the attention allocated to macro variables. Optimal signals are also indeterminate in the
sense that the number of signals is not unique. Signals of any dimension that yield the
same conditional covariance matrix of the variables of interest imply the same price setting
behavior and are associated with the same information  ow. See equations (1)-(4).
38One exception is a lter with a zero coe!cient on the period w signal.39
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8 Extensions and shortcomings
8.1 The Gaussianity assumption
So far we have solved the model assuming that signals have to follow a Gaussian process.
Now we drop this assumption. When the objective function in the rms’ attention problem
is quadratic and the variables being tracked follow a Gaussian process, Gaussian signals
are optimal. The proof of this result is in the Technical Appendix. Hence, after the log-
quadratic approximation to the prot function, Gaussian signals are optimal and dropping
the Gaussianity assumption has no eect on the equilibrium. The following questions arise.
What is the optimal form of uncertainty without the log-quadratic approximation to the
prot function? What is the optimal allocation of attention without the log-quadratic
approximation to the prot function? Solving for the equilibrium of the model without
the log-quadratic approximation is very di!cult. We approach this problem by making two
simplications. First, we focus on the white noise case. Second, we only study the attention
problem of an individual rm. We do not derive the rational expectations equilibrium.
Once we move away from the log-quadratic approximation, we must specify a particular
prot function. We assume that the demand for good l is \lw = \w (Slw@Sw)
3 with A1.
We assume that the output of rm l is \lw = ]lwO
!
lw where Olw is labor input and ! 5 (0>1].
Furthermore, we assume that the cost of labor expressed in consumption units equals "\

w
with "A0 and   0.39 Then the prot function of rm l is


























Expressing the prot function in terms of log-deviations from the non-stochastic solution
of the model and using 1
¡
1>1> ¯ \>¯ ]
¢
=0yields















39Consider a yeoman farmer model or a model with a labor market. Suppose that utility is additively
separable in consumption and labor. With constant relative risk aversion equal to  and constant disutility
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The prot-maximizing price of rm l in period w is
s+
lw = sw +
! +1 !
! + (1  !)
|w 
1
! + (1  !)
}lw= (65)
We study the attention problem of an individual rm assuming that the aggregate
variables are given by sw = tw and |w =( 1 )tw. Then the prot-maximizing price (65)






lw denotes the response to aggregate conditions and sL
lw denotes the response to idio-
syncratic conditions. We assume as before that the responses to aggregate and idiosyncratic






















Figures 12 and 14 show the solution for  =7 , ! =2 @3,  =2 ,  =1 @4, t =0 =025,
} =0 =25 and  =3 .41 Figure 12 shows the joint distribution of sL
lw and }lw under rational
inattention. Figure 14 shows the joint distribution of sD
lw and tw under rational inattention.
Figures 13 and 15 depict the corresponding joint distributions without the information  ow
constraint. The rm allocates 90% of the information  ow to idiosyncratic conditions. We
compare this allocation of attention to the allocation of attention that we obtain when we
take a log-quadratic approximation to the prot function (63). In the discrete case analyzed
here, the attention allocated to idiosyncratic conditions equals 90%. In the continuous case
analyzed in Section 5, the attention allocated to idiosyncratic conditions equals 89%. Hence,
the log-quadratic approximation to the prot function seems to have no noticeable eect
on the allocation of attention.
40The denition of mutual information between two discrete random variables is given in Cover and
Thomas (1991), Chapter 2.
41This means that we set the standard deviation of tw approximately equal to the empirical standard
deviation of nominal aggregate demand and we set the standard deviation of }lw to the number that is
required to obtain an average absolute size of price changes of about 10% in the white noise case.41
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The distributions depicted in Figures 12 and 14 have non-Gaussian features. The rm
decides to make smaller mistakes when productivity is high.42 In addition, the conditional
distribution of the response to aggregate conditions has two peaks for some values of nominal
aggregate demand. However, the departures from normality are small for our choice of .
Furthermore, our choice of  implies a low marginal value of information  ow. In contrast,
when we decrease  by a lot and thereby we raise the marginal value of information  ow
by a lot, the marginal distribution of the response to idiosyncratic conditions and the
marginal distribution of the response to aggregate conditions have only a few mass points.
Hence, our ndings resemble the ndings in Sims (2006). Gaussian uncertainty is a good
approximation when the marginal value of information  ow is low. Gaussian uncertainty is
a bad approximation when the marginal value of information  ow is high.43
8.2 The independence assumption
So far we have assumed that attending to aggregate conditions and attending to idio-
syncratic conditions are separate activities. This implies that a manager is able to explain
what has caused the change in the prot-maximizing price (a change in aggregate conditions
and/or a change in idiosyncratic conditions). In contrast, without the independence assump-
tion the manager would decide to get a signal directly concerning the prot-maximizing price
and would not be able to explain what has caused the change in the prot-maximizing price.
We think that the model with the independence assumption is more realistic.
Furthermore, the main predictions of the model are robust to small deviations from the
independence assumption. Suppose that rm l can choose signals of the form
v1lw = w + $
ˆ 14
|ˆ 11|
}lw + %lw> (66)
v2lw = $w +
ˆ 14
|ˆ 11|
}lw + #lw> (67)
where $  0 is a parameter. In contrast to the signals (28)-(29) the signals (66)-(67) have
the property that each signal contains information about both aggregate and idiosyncratic
42In contrast, a multivariate Gaussian distribution has the property that the conditional variance is inde-
pendent of the realization.
43See Sims (2006), p. 161.42
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conditions. The signals (66)-(67) can be interpreted as attending to pieces of data that reveal
information about both aggregate and idiosyncratic conditions. We study the attention
problem of an individual rm in the white noise case by letting the decisionmaker choose
the variances 2
% and 2
# subject to the information  ow constraint (12). If $?1 the
decisionmaker chooses a higher precision for signal two. If $A1 the decisionmaker chooses
a higher precision for signal one. Hence, so long as $ 6=1the decisionmaker chooses a higher
precision for the signal that contains more information about idiosyncratic conditions and
the price set by the rm responds more to idiosyncratic shocks than to aggregate shocks. See
Figure 16 and the Technical Appendix.44 As $ $ 0 or $ $4the solution converges to the
solution presented in Section 5. Only if the decisionmaker can attend directly to a su!cient
statistic concerning the prot-maximizing price ($ =1 ) the price responds strongly to
idiosyncratic shocks and to aggregate shocks.45 Hence, the main predictions of the model
are robust to small deviations from the independence assumption: decisionmakers pay more
attention to idiosyncratic conditions and prices respond more to idiosyncratic shocks.46
8.3 Reconsidering the allocation of attention
Suppose that in some period wA0 a decisionmaker can reconsider the allocation of atten-
tion. The realization of the signal process up to period w aects conditional means but does
not aect conditional variances, because in a Gaussian environment conditional variances
are independent of realizations. The conditional variance of the prot-maximizing response
to aggregate conditions and the conditional variance of the prot-maximizing response to
idiosyncratic conditions are deterministic. In fact, due to assumption (18) the conditional
variances are constant over time. Hence, in period zero the decisionmaker anticipates cor-
rectly the conditional variances in period w and has no incentive to reoptimize in period
w.
44Figure 16 is drawn assuming the parameter values used in Section 8.1.
45The shape of Figure 16 follows from the fact that the decisionmaker decides to receive only one signal
in a neighborhood of $ =1and switches from signal two to signal one at $ =1 .
46Even if some rms can attend directly to a su!cient statistic concerning the prot-maximizing price, it
seems unlikely that all r m sh a v et h i so p p o r t u n i t y . I fa l lrms had this opportunity, it would be di!cult
to explain why managers spend a non-negligible fraction of their time making price setting decisions. See
Footnote 4.43
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8.4 Shortcomings
The model has some shortcomings. The model cannot explain why prices remain xed
for some time. In the model prices change every period. One could add a menu cost. It
may be that reality is a combination of a menu cost model and the model presented here.
Adding a menu cost is likely to increase the real eects of nominal shocks even further. For
a given allocation of attention, the menu cost will make the response of the price level to a
nominal shock even more dampened and delayed. If prices are strategic complements, this
implies that rms shift attention toward idiosyncratic conditions and away from aggregate
conditions. In addition, rms may also shift attention towards idiosyncratic conditions and
away from aggregate conditions, because changes in idiosyncratic conditions are more likely
to move the price outside the inaction band. These observations suggest that there may be
interesting interactions between a menu cost and rational inattention.
In this paper we try to make progress modeling how agents take decisions in complex
environments. In this respect we think that the model has two shortcomings. First, we
do not spell out all factors that make the price setting decision complicated. We assume
a general prot function. We summarize the market-specic factors by the idiosyncratic
state variable. We choose a value for the information  ow parameter such that rms take
good but not perfect decisions. We focus on the tension between attending to aggregate
conditions and attending to idiosyncratic conditions. In many models of price setting used
in macroeconomics the optimal decision is so simple that it may be unclear why rms make
mistakes at all. For example, in a model with monopolistic competition, Dixit-Stiglitz
preferences and linear technology in homogeneous labor the prot-maximizing price equals
a constant markup times the nominal wage divided by labor productivity. We think that
in reality setting the prot-maximizing price is substantially more complicated, e.g., the
optimal markup may vary, there may be decreasing returns, there may be dierent types of
labor, there may be various other inputs, the interaction with competitors may be complex,
the interaction with customers may be complex, etc. In the future it could be desirable
to spell out all factors that make the price setting decision complicated. Second, rational
inattention captures some (but certainly not all) aspects of decisionmaking in complex
environments. Rational inattention captures the idea that making good decisions is more44
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complicated when rms operate in a more volatile and less persistent environment. Rational
inattention does not capture the idea that the size of mistakes also depends on how complex
the actual computation is that leads to the decision. The latter aspect of decisionmaking
has been emphasized by Gabaix and Laibson (2000).
9 Conclusions and further research
We have studied a model in which price-setting rms decide what to pay attention to. If
idiosyncratic conditions are more variable or more important than aggregate conditions,
rms pay more attention to idiosyncratic conditions than to aggregate conditions. Prices
respond strongly and quickly to idiosyncratic shocks, but prices respond only weakly and
slowly to nominal shocks. The model can explain the combination of observations that
individual prices move around a lot and, at the same time, the price level responds slowly
to monetary policy shocks.
It matters how we model price stickiness. Rational inattention suggests dierent lessons
for monetary policy than standard sticky price models. Rational inattention suggests that
stabilizing monetary policy is good because it allows the private sector to focus on market-
specic conditions. Interest rate smoothing is good because it makes the rms’ tracking
problem easier. The allocation of attention changes as monetary policy changes.
It will be interesting to develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which
rms and households choose their allocation of attention and to compare the predictions
to, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003).
Furthermore, it will be interesting to study the interactions between a menu cost and
rational inattention. In addition, it may be interesting to apply this modeling approach to
other areas in economics, where it has been noted that idiosyncratic uncertainty dominates
aggregate uncertainty.47
It will also be interesting to compare the predictions of the model to micro and macro
data. The model predicts that, if the degree of real rigidity is the same across sectors, rms
operating in more volatile sectors respond more slowly to nominal shocks. Furthermore,
47See, for example, Pischke (1995).45
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the model predicts that as the variance of nominal aggregate demand increases the Phillips
curve becomes steeper and, at the same time, real volatility increases.46
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AI n f o r m a t i o n  ow in the white noise case
The denition of information  ow (4) and the equation for mutual information (3) yield




[K ([1>===>[ W)  K ([1>===>[ W|\1>===>\ W)]=
Using equation (1) for the entropy of a multivariate normal distribution and the fact that










Using equation (2) for the conditional entropy of a multivariate normal distribution and
the fact that the random variables [1>===>[ W are conditionally independent given \1>===>\ W
yields

























































BI n f o r m a t i o n  ow constraint in the white noise case
The independence assumption (17) implies that
I ({Sw>] lw};{vlw})=I ({sw};{v1lw})+I ({}lw};{v2lw})=
S e eL e m m a2 .T h ef a c tt h a t(sw>v 1lw) follows a bivariate Gaussian white noise process and
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See equation (5). Using sw = tw, w = tw+(ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)(1 )tw and the equation for the












































C Proof of lemma 1














































where the second equality follows from equation (24). Equation (21), |w = tw  sw and





follows a stationary Gaussian process. Furthermore,








=  +  (O)vlw>
where  is a constant and  (O) is an innite order vector lag polynomial. Hence, s+
lw  sW
lw
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D Proof of lemma 2
First, Sw and ]lw can be calculated from sw and }lw and vice versa. Therefore
I ({Sw>] lw};{vlw})=I ({sw>} lw};{vlw})=
The denition of information  ow (4) and the equation for mutual information (3) yield

















where sW  (s1>===>s W), }W






.T h e g u e s s ( 3 9 )
implies that the random vectors sW and }W















The assumption (16)-(17) implies that the random vectors sW and }W
l are also conditionally












































= I ({sw};{v1lw})+I ({}lw};{v2lw})=
Second, the denition of information  ow (4) and the equation for mutual information
(3) yield
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The same arguments yield
I ({}lw};{v2lw})  I ({}lw};{ˆ }lw})=
Third, consider the special case of a univariate signal v1lw. Assumption (15) implies that
(sw>v 1lw) follows a bivariate stationary Gaussian process. The denition of w, |w = tw  sw,






=  + I (O)v1lw>





follows a bivariate stationary Gaussian process. It follows from equation (6) that, if









The coherence between two stochastic processes equals the product of the two cross spectra
divided by the product of the two spectra.
Cs>ˆ {l ($)=
Vs>ˆ {l ($)Vˆ {l>s ($)
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where the second equality follows from the fact that the ˆ lw process is obtained from the
v1lw process by applying a linear lter. See Hamilton (1994), pages 277-278. The same
arguments yield that, if v2lw is a univariate signal, then
I ({}lw};{v2lw})=I ({}lw};{ˆ }lw})=
Fourth, one can state the guess (39) as
sw = (O)w>
where (O) is an innite order lag polynomial. Let the moving average representation for
tw be given by
tw = D(O)w>













The sw process is obtained from the w process by applying a linear lter. Thus
Cs>ˆ {l ($)=C>ˆ {l ($)=
The w process is also obtained from the w process by applying a linear lter. Thus
C{>ˆ {l ($)=C>ˆ {l ($)=




















This argument applies to sw, tw, |w and all linear combinations of these variables. Hence, it
does not matter which macro variable one includes in the information  ow constraint.
E Proof of proposition 1
First, when the prot function is given by (19) and (39) holds, the objective function (45)
is a monotonic transformation of the objective function (13). This follows from Lemma 1
and equation (41). Hence, one can use either objective function to evaluate decisions.51
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1009
February 2009
Second, the information  ow constraint (12) implies (46). This follows from Lemma 2.
Furthermore, the denition of the set , |w = tw  sw and assumption (18) imply (47)-(48).
Hence, expected prots at a solution to (12)-(14) cannot be strictly larger than expected
prots at a solution to (45)-(48).
Third, suppose that there exists a bivariate signal process {v1lw>v 2lw} 5  that has
the property (49)-(50). Since v1lw and v2lw are scalars, inequality (43) holds with equality






satises (46) implies that {v1lw>v 2lw} satises (12).






is a solution to the problem (45)-(48) implies that
{v1lw>v 2lw} must be a solution to the problem (12)-(14).
F Proof of proposition 2
First, the mean of \w aects the objective function (51) but does not aect the information
 ow in (54). Thus a solution to the problem (51)-(54) has to satisfy
H [\w]=H [[w]=
Second, a solution to the problem (51)-(54) has to satisfy, for all n =0 >1>2>===,
H [([w  \w)\w3n]=0 =
Take a process \ 0
w that does not have this property. Formally, for some n 5 {0>1>2>===},
H
£¡







Then one can dene a new process \ 00
w as follows
\ 00
w = \ 0
w + \ 0
w3n>
where  is the projection coe!cient in the linear projection of [w  \ 0
w on \ 0
w3n.I ti se a s y
to verify that the new process has the property
H
h¡

























because applying a linear lter does not change the information  o w .S e ep r o o fo fL e m m a
2. Hence, the process \ 0
w cannot be a solution to the problem (51)-(54).52
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G Proof of proposition 3
We rst establish a lower bound for the mean squared error at the solution. We then show
that the process \ W
w attains this bound and satises the information  ow constraint. These
results imply that the process \ W
w is a solution.












where [W  ([1>===>[ W) and \ W  (\1>===>\ W). Furthermore let \ w31  (\1>===>\ w31).
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Second, the process \ W
w has the property





































The rst of the last two equations yields
H
h








































Hence, for the process \ W



















H Proof of proposition 4

























(Vw  H [Vw|Vw31])
2
i =


























































([w31  H [[w31|Vw31])
2
i





































Computing the moving average representation for \ W
w from the last equation yields equation
(58). Hence, the guess is correct.
I Numerical solution procedure









where {w} and {lw} are independent Gaussian white noise processes. The denition of w,































































log2 [1  C}l>ˆ }l ($)]g$  >
where {%lw} and {#lw} are idiosyncratic Gaussian white noise processes that are mutually
independent and independent of {w} and {lw}. Here we make use of equation (6) to express
information  ow as a function of coherence.56
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are dened as I
¡
hl$¢














C ln[1  C}l>ˆ }l ($)]
Cio
g$>










C ln[1  C}l>ˆ }l ($)]
Cjo
g$=
We obtain a system of nonlinear equations in f, g, i, j and  that we solve numerically.57
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o=0 dowo> =0 =01 The MA representation of nominal aggregate demand tw
with d0 =1 >d o = do1  0=05>o=1 >===>20
t =0 =0268 The standard deviation of nominal aggregate demand tw
}lw =
P20
o=0 eolwo> =0 =1 The MA representation of the idiosyncratic state variables }lw
with eo = do>o=0 >1>===>20
} =0 =268 The standard deviation of the idiosyncratic state variables }lw
(ˆ 14@|ˆ 11|)=1 Determines the sensitivity of prices to the idiosyncratic state variables }lw
(ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)=0 =15 Determines the sensitivity of prices to real aggregate demand |w
 =3 The upper bound on the information  ow
Result Interpretation
8=2% The average absolute size of price changes

1 =0 =19> 
2 =2 =81 94% of attention is allocated to idiosyncratic conditions
H
·³
w  ˆ 
lw
´2¸







(}lw  ˆ }
lw)
2i
=0 =00021 Expected per period loss from imperfect tracking of }lw62
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Table 2: Varying parameter values
Change in parameter values Changes in the results
relative to the benchmark economy in Table 1
 =0 =12 The average absolute size of price changes equals 10%
Larger variance of the idiosyncratic state variables 
1 decreases to 4% of 
H
·³















 =0 =5 The average absolute size of price changes equals 35%
Larger variance of nominal aggregate demand 
1 increases to 76% of 
H
·³















(ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)=0 =1 The average absolute size of price changes equals 8.2%
Higher degree of real rigidity 
1 decreases to 5% of 
H
·³














(ˆ 13@|ˆ 11|)=0 =95 The average absolute size of price changes equals 8.2%
Lower degree of real rigidity 
1 increases to 12% of 
H
·³
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Figure 1: Impulse response of an individual price to an innovation in the idiosycratic state variable, benchmark economy







Figure 2: Impulse response of an individual price to an innovation in nominal aggregate demand, benchmark economy
Periods







Δ at the fixed point with rational inattention64
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Figure 3: Simulated price set by an individual firm in the benchmark economy








Figure 4: Simulated aggregate price level
Periods
Log-deviations from the non-stochastic solution
Rational inattention
Profit-maximizing price
Aggregate price level, rational inattention, benchmark economy
Conditional expectation of the aggregate price level, rational inattention, benchmark economy
Aggregate price level, perfect information65
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Figure 5: Impulse response of the aggregate price level to an innovation in nominal aggregate demand







Impulse responses to shocks of one standard deviation
Figure 6: Impulse response of an individual price to an innovation in the idiosycratic state variable








Figure 7: Impulse response of the aggregate price level to an innovation in nominal aggregate demand
Perfect information
Rational inattention, benchmark economy
Larger variance of the idiosyncratic state variable
Perfect information
Rational inattention, benchmark economy
Larger variance of nominal aggregate demand
Perfect information
Rational inattention, benchmark economy, π
13/⏐π
11⏐=0.15
Higher degree of real rigidity, π
13/⏐π
11⏐=0.1
Lower degree of real rigidity, π
13/⏐π
11⏐=0.3




Working Paper Series No 1009
February 2009







Figure 8: Impulse response of the aggregate price level to an innovation in nominal aggregate demand







Figure 9: Impulse response of the aggregate price level to an innovation in nominal aggregate demand
Impulse responses to shocks of one standard deviation
Periods
Perfect information
Rational inattention, benchmark economy, size of price changes 8.2%
Rational inattention, size of price changes 6.3%
Rational inattention, size of price changes 4.7%
Perfect information





Working Paper Series No 1009
February 2009







Figure 10: An optimal signal about idiosyncratic conditions, benchmark economy







Figure 11: An optimal signal about aggregate conditions, benchmark economy
Lags
Coefficients in the MA representation
MA representation of Δ
t
MA representation of noise
MA representation of z
it
MA representation of noise68
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Figure 16: Price responses as a function of the parameter ω, see Section 8.2
Price response under rational inattention relative to price response under perfect information 
Parameter ω
Price response to idiosyncratic state variable
Price response to nominal aggregate demand71
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1009
February 2009
Technical Appendix to
Optimal Sticky Prices under Rational Inattention
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This Technical Appendix contains proofs of three results that appear in the paper “Optimal
Sticky Prices under Rational Inattention.” In Section 2 of the Technical Appendix we derive
equation (38). In Section 3 of the Technical Appendix we prove that, after the log-quadratic
approximation to the prot function, Gaussian signals are optimal. In Section 4 of the
Technical Appendix we derive the relevant equations for the problem studied in Section 8.2.
2 Equilibrium price level in the white noise case
In Section 5, we start from the guess
sw = tw (1)
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The equilibrium price level is the xed point of the mapping between the perceived law of
motion (1) and the actual law of motion (2). Since the optimal allocation of attention can
be a corner solution we have to distinguish three possible cases.
First, suppose that in equilibrium rms allocate no attention to aggregate conditions,
W
1 =0 . Then the actual law of motion for the price level is
sW
w =0 =
The xed point of the mapping between the perceived law of motion and the actual law of
motion is
 =0 = (3)





which implies that W


























Hence, there exists an equilibrium with W
1 =0if and only if the parameters satisfy (4).
The equilibrium is given by (3).
Second, suppose that in equilibrium rms allocate all attention to aggregate conditions,
W
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The xed point of the mapping between the perceived law of motion and the actual law of
















1+( 2 2  1) ˆ 13
|ˆ 11|
= (5)




1+( 2 2  1) ˆ 13
|ˆ 11|
tw>
which implies that W






























2  23¢ ˆ 13
|ˆ 11|
= (6)
Hence, there exists an equilibrium with W
1 =  if and only if the parameters satisfy (6).
The equilibrium is given by (5).
Third, suppose that in equilibrium rms allocate attention to aggregate and idiosyncratic
conditions, W
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The xed point of the mapping between the perceived law of motion and the actual law of
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13

































 + ˆ 13
|ˆ 11| (1  )
i
¯ ¯ ¯ + ˆ 13
|ˆ 11| (1  )
¯ ¯ ¯
= (7)
Now there are two possibilities. The rst possibility is  + ˆ 13


























































































2  23¢ ˆ 13
|ˆ 11|
= (9)
The second possibility is  + ˆ 13
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2  23¢ ˆ 13
|ˆ 11|
= (10)
The rst inequality in (10) can never be satised. Hence, there exists an equilibrium with
W
1 5 (0>1) if and only if the parameters satisfy (9). The equilibrium is given by (8).
Collecting results yields equation (38) in the paper. Note that there is always a unique
linear rational expectations equilibrium.
3 Optimality of Gaussian signals
3.1 The white noise case
So far we have only allowed Gaussian signals. Now we relax this assumption. We assume
that the conditional distribution of the variables of interest up to time w given the signals
up to time w has a density function. We continue to assume that the joint distribution of
the variables of interest up to time w and the signals up to time w is independent of time. In
this subsection, we assume that the variables of interest follow a white noise process. After
the log-quadratic approximation to the prot function, Gaussian signals are optimal.
Let 2 denote the information  ow allocated to idiosyncratic conditions
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The rst equality follows from the fact that mutual information equals the dierence between
entropy and conditional entropy. The second equality follows from the fact that the entropy
of independent random variables equals the sum of their entropies. The third equality
follows from the chain rule for entropy. The weak inequality follows from the fact that
conditioning reduces entropy. See Cover and Thomas (1991), p. 232, for these results. The































































The rst equality follows from the fact that mutual information equals the dierence be-
tween entropy and conditional entropy. The second equality follows from the denition of
conditional entropy, where ˜ vw
2l denotes a realization of vw
2l.T h er s tw e a ki n e q u a l i t yf o l l o w s
from the fact that the normal density maximizes entropy over all densities with the same
variance. See Cover and Thomas (1991), chapter 11. The second weak inequality follows
from Jensen’s inequality. The last equality follows from the equation for the entropy of a
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After the log-quadratic approximation to the prot function, the expected period w loss





































It is easy to verify that a Gaussian white noise signal of the form v2lw = }lw+#lw attains this
bound. See Section 5 of the paper or simply note that in this case all the weak inequalities
given above hold with equality. Hence, a Gaussian white noise signal is optimal.
The same arguments yield that, after the log-quadratic approximation to the prot
function, a Gaussian white noise signal of the form v1lw = w + %lw is optimal.
3.2 The general case
We now turn to the general case where the variables being tracked follow arbitrary stationary
Gaussian processes. We again assume that the conditional distribution of the variables of
interest up to time w given the signals up to time w has a density function. Furthermore,
we continue to assume that the joint distribution of the variables of interest up to time w
and the signals up to time w is independent of time. We also continue to assume that rms
receive a long sequence of signals in period one. We prove the following result. After the
log-quadratic approximation to the prot function, Gaussian signals are optimal.
Let 2 denote the information  ow allocated to idiosyncratic conditions



















. The mutual information can be78
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The rst equality follows from the fact that mutual information equals the dierence be-
tween entropy and conditional entropy. The second equality follows from the denition of
conditional entropy, where ˜ vW
2l denotes a realization of vW
2l. The weak inequality (11) follows
from the fact that the multivariate normal density maximizes entropy over all densities
with the same covariance matrix. See Cover and Thomas (1991), chapter 11. The weak
inequality (12) follows from Ky Fan’s inequality which states that the log of the determinant
of a symmetric nonnegative denite matrix is a concave function. See Cover and Thomas
(1991), page 501. If }W
l and vW
2l have a multivariate normal distribution then the conditional
distribution of }W
l given vW
2l is a normal distribution and the conditional covariance matrix
of }W
l given vW
2l is independent of the realization of vW
2l. In this case, the weak inequalities


















After the log-quadratic approximation to the prot function, the expected discounted








































































Working Paper Series No 1009
February 2009
The assumption that the joint distribution of }w
l and vw
2l is independent of w in combination










































for any W  1.
Equation (15) implies that the expected discounted sum of losses in prots due to






































is minimized by a multivariate normal distribution for }W
l
and vW
2l. Hence, Gaussian signals are optimal.
The same arguments yield that Gaussian signals about aggregate conditions are optimal.
4 Attending to variables that reveal information about both
aggregate and idiosyncratic conditions
Let the prot function be given by equation (19) in the paper. Then the price set by rm l
in period w is given by equation (20) in the paper and the prot-maximizing price is given by
equation (21) in the paper. For simplicity, consider the case where tw and }lw follow Gaussian
white noise processes and sw = tw. For ease of exposition, assume that (ˆ 14@|ˆ 11|)=1 .
Suppose that rm l can choose signals of the form
v1lw = w + $}lw + %lw>
v2lw = $w + }lw + #lw>
where the parameter $  0 and {%lw} and {#lw} are idiosyncratic Gaussian white noise
processes that are mutually independent and independent of {w} and {}lw}. The price set80
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The information  ow equals
I ({Sw>] lw};{vlw})
= I ({sw>} lw};{vlw})
= L (sw>} lw;vlw)
= K (vlw)  K (vlw|sw>} lw)










































The second equality follows from the assumption that sw, }lw and vlw =( v1lw>v 2lw) follow
white noise processes. The third equality follows from the fact that mutual information
equals the dierence between entropy and conditional entropy. The fourth equality follows
from the fact that sw and w c o n t a i nt h es a m ei n f o r m a t i o ni nt h ew h i t en o i s ec a s e . T h e
fth equality follows from the expressions for the entropy and the conditional entropy of a
multivariate normal distribution.












so as to minimize the expected
period w loss in prots (16) subject to a constraint on the information  ow (17) is a standard





}) ? 1. Then there is a critical value ¯ $ 5 [0>1).F o r $ 5 [0> ¯ $) the rm decides to81
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receive both signals. For $ 5 [¯ $>1) the rm decides to receive only signal two. At $ =1






the rm decides to receive only signal one. For $A1
¯ $ the rm decides to receive
both signals. So long as $ 6=1 , the price set by rm l responds more to idiosyncratic
conditions than to aggregate conditions. As $ $ 0 or $ $4the solution converges to the
solution presented in Section 5 of the paper.82
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